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Talent for Sale:
The Need for Enhanced Scrutiny
in Judicial Evaluation of Acqui-Hires
Samantha Nolan*
Large technology corporations are purchasing smaller companies at an increasing rate
with one goal in mind—engineers. This practice has recently been given its own name—
acqui-hiring. The buying corporation purchases the target, poaches its employees,
jettisons its projects, and generally kills the company. Who is injured in this process?
Those who were legally supposed to be afforded the highest degree of protection at the
target companies—the shareholder investors.
This Note examines the practice of acqui-hiring and suggests that courts should analyze
these transactions under heightened scrutiny. When addressing a target board’s decision
to enter into an acqui-hire, courts can find guidance in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., an acquisition case that arose during a climate of similar corporate
concerns.
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Introduction
An “acqui-hire” occurs when a company purchases a start-up in
order to obtain desired talent, usually its founders and certain
employees, and thereafter often kills the corporation or at least jettisons
1
its products. Acqui-hiring is currently well known to those working in
the technology sectors of business development, law, and investment in
1. Miguel Helft, For Buyers of Web Start-Ups, Quest to Corral Young Talent, N.Y. Times, May
18, 2011, at A1; Nate C. Hindman, The Top 15 Tech ‘Acqui-Hires’, HuffPost Tech (May 27, 2011,
10:29 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/29/acqui-hires_n_867865.html.
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Silicon Valley. However, recognition of the practice elsewhere is
increasing, evidenced by the fact that it was even alluded to in HBO’s hit
2
series Silicon Valley. This widespread awareness of acqui-hiring is bound to
continue, as leading technology corporations are purchasing smaller start-up
companies that operate in the same or similar fields at an increasing
3
rate. While this might sound reminiscent of common corporate practices,
the interesting twist in these transactions is that the buyer (“buying
company” or “buying corporation”) is not interested in the projects or
assets of the company being acqui-hired (“target company” or “target
4
corporation”). Instead, the buyer is compelled by the desire to hire some
or all of the target company’s engineers (“target employees” or “moving
5
employees”). These transactions have grown to be so common that they
6
have earned their own name—“acqui-hires.”
While documentation of this emerging practice has largely been
confined to technology columns and blogs, a small number of legal
authors have attempted to identify the possible motivation of the buyers
7
in these transactions. In contrast, the purpose of this Note is to explore
the actions of the leaders at the target companies and recommend a
heightened level of judicial scrutiny when reviewing them. Enhanced
judicial scrutiny is necessary because directors of corporations have
fiduciary duties to their shareholders, and these duties may be
compromised in acqui-hire transactions due to a number of concerns,
including self-dealing and misplaced fiduciary duties. While acqui-hiring
is a novel practice, the legal community can find guidance in past judicial
directives that demanded increased protection for shareholders during a
climate of similar corporate concerns.
8
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. was a
groundbreaking case regarding specified duties of corporate directors
9
and it created what are known today as “Revlon duties.” According to
Revlon, a corporation’s “board of directors has a duty to maximize
shareholder value in the event that either the company is for sale or the
10
break-up of the company becomes inevitable.” If a board decides to sell
2. Silicon Valley: Bad Money (HBO television broadcast Apr. 26, 2015).
3. John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-Hiring, 63 Duke L.J. 281, 283 (2013).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 284. “Some commentators refer to this phenomenon as an ‘acqhire’ or a ‘talent
acquisition.’” Id. at 284, n.4.
7. See Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 283, 292, 315, 318 (explaining acqui-hiring as an attempt
to remain on friendly terms with venture capitalists); Andres Sawicki, Buying Teams, 38 Seattle U. L.
Rev. 651, 651 (2015) (arguing that patent law is a motivation of “the choice to pursue an acqui-hire
because it enables the buyer to obtain assets useful in team production”).
8. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
9. Janet E. Kerr, Delaware Goes Shopping for a “New” Interpretation of the Revlon Standard:
The Effect of the QVC Decision on Strategic Mergers, 58 Alb. L. Rev. 609, 620 (1995).
10. Id. at 626.
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a company and there is a question as to whether the board is fulfilling its
Revlon duties, the actions of the directors “are no longer protected by
11
the business judgment rule and are subject to [] enhanced
scrutiny . . . . The [Revlon] court stated that the board must be active, not
passive. It must stimulate competitive bidding and not lay barriers to the
12
process.” In other words, once it is inevitable that a company will be
sold or dissolved, the board members are required to actively pursue the
highest sale price in the interest of increasing shareholder profits. As
judges encounter more and more acqui-hire cases, Revlon can provide
them with a standard under which to evaluate the decisions of the boards
at the companies being acqui-hired (“target boards”).
The actions of target boards in acqui-hire transactions are beginning
to be scrutinized by adversely affected individuals associated with the
target corporations. California courts are now presented with cases
13
focusing on acqui-hires, namely, Graphicly, Inc. v. Blurb, Inc. and
14
Opperman v. Path, Inc. In Graphicly, a shareholder of the target
company filed suit against the Graphicly board members and the
15
purchasing corporation, Blurb, Inc. The complaint alleged that “the
Board of Graphicly tacitly agreed to give away the company’s only assets
to Blurb with no consideration paid to the shareholders of Graphicly
16
then let the company shut down.” The claim centered on the assertion
that the board breached its fiduciary duties by strategically transferring
members of the Graphicly creative team and “not taking action to
protect [] confidentiality and proprietary information from being
17
accessed by [] Blurb.” The Plaintiff claimed such a breach of fiduciary
duties caused the company to suffer damages in excess of five million
18
dollars.
In comparison, the complaint in Opperman was not filed by a
shareholder, but was brought on behalf of past tort victims of a target

11. This rule reflects a judicial policy of deferring to the business judgment of corporate directors
when they make corporate decisions: “courts will not second-guess a business decision, so long as
corporate management exercised a minimum level of care in arriving at the decision.” 3A Jennifer L.
Berger et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 1036 (2015). See Part
I.B.I for a more detailed discussion of the business judgment rule.
12. Kerr, supra note 9, at 626–27.
13. Response to Defendants’ Motion for Realignment of Graphicly, Inc. to a Defendant,
Graphicly, Inc. v. Blurb, Inc. at 3, No. 5:14-cv-04630-NC, 2014 WL 6711931 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2014)
[hereinafter Response to Defendants’ Motion for Realignment].
14. 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
15. Response to Defendants’ Motion for Realignment, supra note 13, at 3.
16. Id. at 1.
17. Jury Demanded, Graphicly, Inc. v. Blurb, Inc. at 2, No. 5:14-cv-04630-NC, 2014 WL 5337027
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2014).
18. Id. at 3.
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corporation on claims of successor liability and fraudulent transfer. The
Opperman complaint declared that “[t]he acqui-hire is just the latest
incarnation of the age-old (and mostly discredited) strategy of buying
20
assets while claiming not to buy liabilities in a corporate acquisition.”
The plaintiffs implored the court to make the first judicial ruling
21
expressly regulating acqui-hires. The existence of Graphicly and
Opperman suggest that California courts will continue to encounter
acqui-hire cases and should be prepared to address the legal issues acquihires present including fiduciary duty conflicts, fraudulent transfers, and
successor liability issues.
In order to address the concerns that acqui-hires pose, this Note
proposes that (1) once the board of a target company becomes seriously
involved in an acqui-hire, their fiduciary duties should shift to the
requirements called for in Revlon duties, and (2) these transactions
should be viewed as inherently suspect and therefore scrutinized under a
higher standard than the business judgment rule, and perhaps even be
analyzed under an entire fairness standard if self-dealing can be clearly
identified. To establish the foundation for this proposal, Part I provides
background information on acqui-hiring and Revlon duties. Part II then
discusses emerging acqui-hire court cases, identifies what is taken from
shareholders in these transactions, investigates the misplaced fiduciary
duty to employees in these deals, and explains how the requirements that
trigger Revlon duties are present in these transactions. This Note
concludes by suggesting what the duties of target boards in acqui-hire
transactions should be, along with the standard under which judges
should review their actions.

19. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Facebook, Inc.’s and Gowalla Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(6) at 1–2, In re Apple IDevice Address Book Litig., No. 3:13-cv-00453-JST, 2013
U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 9482 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Opposition to
Facebook, Inc.]. “Successor liability is an exception to the general rule that, when one corporate or
other juridical person sells assets to another entity, the assets are transferred free and clear of all but
valid liens and security interests.” George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and Evaluation of Successor
Liability, 6 Fla. St. U. Bus. L. Rev. 9, 11 (2007). “When successor liability is imposed, a creditor or
plaintiff with a claim against the seller may assert that claim against and collect payment from the
purchaser.” Id. In the context of acquisition structures, “[t]he purchaser can leave behind certain
liabilities in an asset sale, whereas in a stock sale the assets remain encumbered by all known and
unknown liabilities.” Brian Stuart Duba & Frost Brown Todd LLC, Asset v. Stock Sales and Backdoor
Liability Assumption in Asset Sales, 33 E. Min. L. Found. § 17.05 (2012). Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “fraudulent conveyance” as a “transfer of property for little or no consideration, made for the
purpose of hindering or delaying a creditor by putting the property beyond the creditor’s reach.”
Fraudulent Conveyance, Black’s Law Dictionary 17(c) (10th ed. 2014).
20. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Facebook, Inc., supra note 19, at 2.
21. Id. at 4.
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I. Background
In order to provide context for the proposals in this Note, this Part
will present background information on acqui-hiring and the relevant
material related to Revlon duties. First, it describes what an acqui-hire is,
gives a short background on company financing, and reviews acqui-hire
concerns that have already been posed. Next, Part I explains the three
levels of judicial review applied to director decisions, provides an
overview of the historical climate at the time of Revlon, presents preRevlon cases and Revlon itself, and lastly provides justifications for the
duties created in Revlon.
A. Acqui-Hiring
1.

What Is an “Acqui-Hire”?

Typical corporate acquisitions are driven by the desire to obtain a
company’s assets, whether they are tangible, such as property or
22
equipment, or intangible, such as intellectual property or reputation.
23
However, acqui-hiring has a different focus altogether—engineers. This
practice is drawing the attention of the business community as the
occurrence rate of acqui-hire deals continues to increase. In fact,
[r]ecent examples of talent-driven transactions include Twitter’s
acquisitions of Summify in January 2012 and Posterous in March
24
2012, Google’s acquisitions of Milk in March 2012 and RestEngine in
25
May 2012, Zynga’s acquisitions of area/code in January 2011 and Buzz
26
Monkey in June 2012, Groupon’s acquisition of ditto.me in April
27
28
2012, LinkedIn’s acquisition of IndexTank in October 2011, and
29
Facebook’s acquisitions of Lightbox and Glancee, both in May 2012.

22. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 293.
23. Id. at 283.
24. Marita Makinen et al., Acqui-Hires for Growth: Planning for Success, 28 Venture Cap. Rev.
31, 31 (2012) (first citing Mike Issac, Twitter Acquires Social-Aggregation Startup Summify, WIRED
(Jan. 19, 2012, 2:23 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/01/twitter-summify-acquisition/; then citing
Laurie Segall, Why Twitter Bought Tumblr’s Biggest Rival, Posterous, CNNMoney (Mar. 14, 2012, 3:06
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/14/technology/posterous_twitter/).
25. Id. at 31 (first citing Alexia Tsotsis, Winning a Bidding War with Facebook, Google Picks up the
Milk Product Team, TechCrunch (Mar. 15, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/03/15/winning-a-biddingwar-with-facebook-google-picks-up-the-entire-milk-team/; then citing Josh Constine, Twitter Buys
Personalized Email Marketer RestEngine to Deliver Best Tweet Digests, TechCrunch (May 10, 2012),
http://techcrunch.com/2012/05/10/twitter-acquires-restengine/).
26. Id. at 32 (first citing Dean Takahashi, Zynga Dials Area/Code Game Studio for an Acquisition,
VentureBeat (Jan. 21, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2011/01/21/zynga-dials-areacode-gamestudio-for-an-acquisition/; then citing Kim-Mai Cutler, Zynga Adds 50 People Through Talent Acquisition of
Video Game Marker Buzz Monkey, TechCrunch (June 4, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/06/04/zyngaacquires-buzz-monkey/).
27. Id. at 32 (citing Colleen Taylor, Groupon Acquires Social Recommendation App Ditto.me,
TechCrunch (Apr. 16, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/04/16/groupon-acquires-ditto-me-the-socialrecommendation-and-planning-app/).
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Even Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of the world’s leading social network
company, has come to embrace the value of acqui-hiring and has said,
“Facebook has not once bought a company for the company itself. We
30
buy companies to get excellent people.” Indeed, the “acqui-hire” label
might be somewhat new, but it is easy to see that the substantive aspect
of these transactions has been very common in recent years.
31
Acqui-hire transactions can be structured in several different ways.
In the acqui-hire’s most basic form, it is structured as a payment of cash
in exchange for the target company’s agreement “not to sue the buyer for
32
hiring its employees” and “the startup thereafter liquidates.” Generally,
large acqui-hire deals are structured as asset sales; however, the only
“assets acquired by the purchaser are whatever intellectual property
rights that the startup owns; other assets—such as property, plant, and
equipment—are left behind. The consideration paid by the buyer and
any residual assets are then distributed to shareholders in the liquidation
33
of the startup.” In even larger acqui-hire transactions, the deal can be
structured as a merger or stock purchase resulting in the target company
generally receiving stock in the buying corporation as part of the
34
consideration. In conclusion, the way that these transactions are
structured affects what exactly the target company investors are left with
when the deal closes.
These transactions have not gone unnoticed, and scholarship
discussing acqui-hires thus far has analyzed the motivation of the buying
corporations. That is, the question presented has been: why do buyers
not save themselves the trouble of the acquisition and simply pursue the
35
engineers individually or “poach” the engineering team in its entirety?
This question is even more poignant given that acqui-hiring was born in
California, a state that provides for easy employee mobility and disfavors

28. Id. at 32 (citing Colleen Taylor, LinkedIn Acquires Search Engine Startup IndexTank,
GIGAOM (Oct. 11, 2011, 2:41 PM), https://gigaom.com/2011/10/11/linkedin-acquires-search-enginestartup-indextank/).
29. Id. at 32 (first citing Josh Constine, Facebook Hires Team from Android Photosharing App Dev
Lightbox to Quiet Mobile Fears, TechCrunch (May 15, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/05/15/facebooklightbox/; then citing Mike Isaac, Ramping up Mobile Discovery, Facebook Acquires Glancee, AllThingsD
(May 4, 2012, 6:40 PM), http://allthingsd.com/20120504/ramping-up-mobile-discovery-facebook-acqhiresglancee/).
30. Id. at 31 (quoting Nathaniel Cahners Hindman, Mark Zuckerberg: ‘We Buy Companies to Get
Excellent People’, Huffington Post (Oct. 19, 2010, 11:18 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/
10/19/mark-zuckerberg-we-buy-co_n_767338.html).
31. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 296.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 282; see also John Sullivan, Acqui-Hiring: A Powerful Recruiting Strategy That You’ve Never
Heard Of, Ere.net (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.ere.net/2012/12/10/acqui-hiring-a-powerful-recruitingstrategy-that-youve-never-heard-of/.
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36

covenants not to compete. Considering that “poaching” employees in
the Golden State arguably involves little fear of litigation, John F. Coyle
and Gregg D. Polsky, in their article titled Acqui-Hiring, proposed that
37
the buyers’ motivation stems from social norms in the Silicon Valley.
They suggested that the buyer is incentivized by a desire to remain on
38
friendly terms with venture capital funds. Other theories of buyer
motivation include a greater chance at retaining the team following the
transaction, or the buyer having a specific project in mind for an
39
engineering team that has already proven itself. Aside from the exact
motivation of the purchasing corporation, it is important to understand
the financial structures of small companies because those in different
financial positions at target corporations will have distinct incentives in a
dissolution.
2.

Company Financing

In order to finance a start-up, entrepreneurs generally sell equity in
their company to outside investors who usually take the form of either
40
venture capitals or wealthy individuals known as “angel investors.” In
exchange for their investment, the venture capitals commonly receive
preferred stock, which generally comes with certain managing rights and
41
a liquidation preference. Angel investors are ordinarily given convertible
promissory notes, though it is becoming increasingly common for these
notes to be entitled to an acquisition premium if the company is acquired
42
before any successive equity financing. In comparison, founders,
employees, and other smaller investors generally receive common stock or
43
the option to purchase such common stock. Based on these facts, it can
be suggested that venture capitals and angel investors have a lowered
risk of financial harm in an acqui-hire and the following dissolution of
assets because they have a liquidation preference and acquisition premium,
respectively. Nevertheless, even with their enhanced financial positions,
these investors still do not receive a full return on their investment in
36. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 282.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 308–09. A venture capital fund is “[a]n investment fund that manages money from investors
seeking private equity stakes in startup and small- and medium-size enterprises with strong growth potential.
These investments are generally characterized as high-risk/high-return opportunities.” Venture Capital
Funds, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/vcfund.asp#ixzz3mhoP26Q9 (last visited Apr. 10,
2016).
39. Makinen et al., supra note 24, at 32–33.
40. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 287–88. “Angel investors are wealthy individuals who
personally finance the same high-risk, high-growth start-ups as venture capitalists but at an earlier
stage.” Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not so) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 1405,
1406 (2008).
41. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 289.
42. Id. at 289–90.
43. Id. at 289.
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acqui-hires because founder “entrepreneurs try to figure out . . . ‘the
lowest amount [that must be paid] to investors so that [they] don’t
44
squawk.’” Moreover, smaller investors and undesired employees with
common stock are at an even greater risk because they are the last to
receive payment, if any even remains. Thus, this financial structure
enhances the apprehensions of investors and shareholders at target
corporations because of the decrease on investment overall and the
increased chance that smaller shareholders will either not get payment or
will get only a nominal amount.
3.

Current Concerns Regarding Acqui-Hiring

In order to provide background on the current apprehensions
surrounding acqui-hires, this Subpart explores concerns that have
previously been presented in the existing literature. First, it sets forth
discoveries of general injustice to acqui-hire target shareholders that
have been identified by those researching the field. To expand on this
issue, the discussion shows that the expected return on investment to
stockholders can be drastically reduced, especially if the consideration
for the transaction is cash or stock in a public company with slower
45
growth. Furthermore, greater concern arises because expenses of acquihires often reduce cash considerations, making these transactions even
46
less appealing to investors. Finally, this Subpart addresses other
concerns that have been identified, including: the way in which the
consideration will be divided at the target corporation; the general
unease regarding the premature death of an emerging company; and the
reality that the deal considerations might include a great amount of
47
illiquid stock for inappropriate employee incentive and tax reasons.
A major issue in acqui-hire negotiations centers on how the buyer’s
collective purchase price will be allocated between the target company’s
48
moving employees and its outside investors. An acqui-hire is usually
structured as an asset sale, or occasionally as a stock purchase or merger
49
with stock in the buyer included as part of the consideration. Either way
it is structured, the buyer offers this consideration in a single aggregate
50
amount. Both the consideration for the deal, which eventually goes to
outside investors and shareholders, and the compensation pool, which
goes to the desired founders and employees for future work, are offered

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 317.
Makinen et al., supra note 24, at 33.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 33, 35.
Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 287.
Id. at 296.
Id. at 299.
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51

together. The compensation pool does not make its way into the hands
of outside investors or employee shareholders whom the buyer does not
52
desire to retain as future employees. Accordingly, these outside
investors and employees would prefer a greater amount to be divided to
the deal consideration pot, while the moving employees and the buyer
53
want a greater amount to go toward the compensation pot. Disputes
about division of these funds present a chief place of disagreement for
shareholders and the negotiating insiders. Therefore, it would be ideal to
alternatively offer these two sets of payment separately in the interest of
protecting investors.
Another frustration with these transactions is that they oftentimes
result in the premature death of companies that might have grown to be
great successes if given the time and opportunity to do so. In regard to
this concern, it is important to point out that acqui-hiring could occur as
an alternative to liquidation, or simply an alternative to continuing
54
business. For example, an acqui-hire that would be an alternative to
liquidation can take place when the target company is unable to
successfully bring a product to the market before it runs out of funding
55
and is unable to access additional money. In this situation, the choice is
generally between acquiescing to the acqui-hire or succumbing to complete
56
liquidation. However, some acqui-hires occur in place of accepting
additional available funding, and this happens when the leaders at the
target corporation decide that the acqui-hire offer is more appealing than
57
continuing as a company. This second scenario implicates fiduciary duties
to stockholders because the target company still has a chance of survival
and possible growth, which suggests that it could have eventually provided
58
larger returns to its investors.
The structure of acqui-hire transactions can also create taxation
concerns for shareholders. Acqui-hires are generally structured as asset
59
purchases. As an alternative, shareholders would prefer to configure the
deals as stock sales or mergers so they would be taxed as stock sales

51. Id. at 297–98.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 299. The purchasing corporations want more money to be allocated to desired employees so
that the employees will be comfortable with the transition and will be more likely to remain in their new
positions long-term. Id.
54. Id. at 295.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. For more information to provide support and context for this proposition see infra Part II.B.
59. Jeff Seul, A 360° View of Current Emerging Company M&A Practice Trends, in Mergers and
Acquisitions Law 2014 Top Lawyers on Trends and Key Strategies for the Upcoming Year 33, 43
(Aspatore 2013). An asset acquisition occurs when a corporation purchases all or substantially all of
another company’s assets, which can include its property and its goodwill, for either money or other
property. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 271 (West 2010).
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60

instead of asset sales. This would be more favorable for the
shareholders “because the deal consideration they receive would be
61
taxed as capital gains (i.e., at a lower rate).” Unfortunately for
shareholders, they are not typically successful in this pursuit because the
target engineers, who are the focus of the deal, would be financially
62
harmed. To illustrate, if the acqui-hire was not structured as an asset
purchase, then all of the consideration received by a target engineer “via
signing bonuses or participation in a buyer’s equity-compensation plan”
63
would be taxed as compensation income. That compensation income
would be subject to a high combined federal and state rate, and therefore
64
would not be financially desirable for the employee. Alternatively, due
to the current popular structure of the acqui-hire, the portion of the
consideration that goes to the engineer from the deal consideration is
65
characterized as payment for her stock in the startup. This payment is
labeled as capital gains and “by shifting part of the buyer’s purchase
price to the deal-consideration pool, the engineer cuts her tax rate
approximately in half on the amounts that come back to her as payment
66
for her equity interest in the startup.” Due to this common method of
structuring acqui-hire transactions, tax apprehensions are simply one of
the many concerns that have already been raised by those who study
these deals. While the above presented concerns surrounding acqui-hires
are legitimate, an approach to address those concerns and regulate acquihires generally can be found within the requirements of fiduciary duties
and accepted case law, such as Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
67
Holdings, Inc.
B. REVLON Duties
In order to identify the relevant legal concepts, this Subpart will first
characterize the three levels of judicial review used to evaluate the
decisions of directors. Next, it will describe the corporate climate at the
time when Revlon and similar cases were decided, as well as present the
relevant cases leading up to Revlon and the Revlon case itself. Lastly, this
Subpart will briefly outline justifications for the creation of Revlon duties.

60. Seul, supra note 59, at 40. Stock sales occur when the target’s shares are sold to the buyer in
exchange for cash, securities, or a combination of both. Mergers occur when the target merges into the
buyer and the stock of the target is exchanged for cash or securities. Stephen I. Glover, Business
Separation Transactions: Spin Offs, Subsidiary IPOs and Tracking Stock § 12A.04[2] 12A-8 (2006).
61. Seul, supra note 59, at 40.
62. See id.
63. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 329.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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The Three Levels of Judicial Review of Directors’ Decisions

When evaluating board decisions, judges apply three levels of
review: (1) the business judgment rule, (2) the reasonableness standard
68
called for under both Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. and Revlon,
69
and (3) the entire fairness standard. The default and most deferential
standard is the business judgment rule, which has essentially become a
70
rubberstamp by judges in the evaluation of board decisionmaking. The
business judgment rule “provides a rebuttable presumption ‘that in making
a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
the best interests of the company.’ Thus, at bottom, the business
71
judgment rule reflects little more than process inquiry.”
The second level, the reasonableness standard, is triggered by certain
facts and involves an investigation by the court into the reasonableness of
72
the decisions of directors. For instance, the Unocal court, in considering
the reasonableness of defensive tactics put in place by the board,
considered whether the board was independent, highly informed, and
73
acted in good faith. Going even further, the Revlon court demanded, in
“change of control” transactions, a more generalized reasonableness,
which included stricter language than Unocal and added a focus on
74
attaining the best value for shareholders. The Revlon reasonableness
“standard requires virtually absolute independence of the board, careful
attention to the type and scope of information to be considered by the
board, good faith negotiation, and a focus on what constitutes the best
75
value for the shareholders.”
The third level, the entire fairness standard, is triggered “where a
majority of the directors approving the transaction [are] interested or
76
where a majority stockholder stands on both sides of the transaction.”
Board members could be considered to be on both sides of the
transaction if they “‘expect to derive any personal financial benefit from
it in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves
77
upon the corporation or all stockholders generally.’” Under entire

68. 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
69. Wells M. Engledow, Structuring Corporate Board Action to Meet the Ever-Decreasing Scope
of Revlon Duties, 63 Alb. L. Rev. 505, 507 (1999).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 507–08 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
72. Engledow, supra note 69, at 508.
73. Id. (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955).
74. Engledow, supra note 69, at 508 (citing Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986)).
75. Engledow, supra note 69, at 508.
76. Id. (internal citations omitted).
77. Id. at 508–09 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
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fairness standard review, the board has the burden of showing, by both
78
fair dealing and fair price, that the transaction was fair to shareholders.
2.

Corporate Climate at Time of Revlon and Similar Cases

The corporate environment at the time of Revlon and its
predecessors draws comparisons to the similar short-term profitability
concerns in acqui-hire transactions. The 1980s were a transformative
period for corporations and corporate law due to struggles for corporate
control, new types of financial acquirers, and a change in the political
79
climate. In the early 1980s, battles for corporate control began as an
effort to capitalize on depressed stock prices, but this quickly transformed
80
into a takeover frenzy. Corporations started to develop new radical
defensive tactics in order to fend off both actual and perceived hostile
81
bidders. Thus, the period produced an increase in hostile acquisitions
leading to a need for more rigorous corporate defensive strategies.
As the form of the conventional American investor shifted,
increased anxieties began to surface that boards were becoming more
concerned with short-term gains rather than the longevity of their
82
companies. In the 1980s, interest rates began falling due to stock prices
being undervalued, and many of the largest companies in America had
83
little debt and a surplus of cash. A chief development that grew out of
84
this situation was the changing nature of the investor. Based on the
goals of the new prominent type of investor, the corporate focus changed
85
from an objective of long-term gains to that of short-run returns.
Consequently, this created an environment where, “[f]or the first time,
corporations were compelled to maximize short-term profitability at the
86
expense of long-term goals.” Acquirers were not concerned with the
corporations they were acquiring or those corporations’ shareholders;

78. Engledow, supra note 69, at 509.
79. Andrew G. T. Moore, II, The 1980s—Did We Save the Stockholders While the Corporation
Burned?, 70 Wash. U. L.Q. 277, 278 (1992) (“The Reagan Administration believed that free markets
worked best, and that government should interfere in business and finance as little as possible.
Laissez-faire was the call of the day.”).
80. Id. at 277 (“With millions to be made in breakups and exorbitant fees, acquirors [sic] and their
financial advisors, who cared little or nothing for the corporation itself, plotted new forms of attack
that made virtually any company a takeover candidate.”).
81. Id. at 277–78.
82. See id. at 278–79.
83. Id. at 278.
84. Id. (“More than fifty percent of the outstanding shares of Fortune 500 companies were held by
institutional investors with professional portfolio managers. Arbitrageurs amassed huge positions in potential
targets—hoping to put companies ‘in play.’ Many such efforts were intentionally manipulative and illegal.”).
85. Id. at 278–79.
86. Id.
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instead their focus was on their own financial profits. Given each of the
contributing circumstances of the time period, it was left to Delaware
courts to regulate corporate takeovers, which they did, most notably in
88
Revlon and its surrounding cases.
3.

Pre-Revlon Cases

The path to the creation of Revlon duties was built on concepts from
corporate cases decided during the several preceding years. The
89
Delaware Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom was
the first in this line of historical cases. The Van Gorkom court held that
board members breach fiduciary duties to stockholders when they obligate
themselves to a sale of the company under hasty and uninformed
90
conditions. Delaware Supreme Court Justice Andrew G. T. Moore II,
who joined the majority opinion, later wrote, “Van Gorkom was much
more a case about process in the takeover environment than anything
91
else.” He explained, “the protection of the business judgment rule is not
a birthright of directors but, rather, is given in return for care, loyalty,
92
and unyielding good faith to the corporation.” Thus, the Van Gorkom
case demonstrated the willingness of judges to question board decisions
when they were not made carefully and in consideration of the
corporation itself and its shareholders.
The court was able to build upon its decision in Van Gorkom when
93
it resolved Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. In Unocal, the
Delaware Supreme Court analyzed, for the first time, a corporation that
94
presented its own self-tender to defend against a hostile takeover offer.
A self-tender is an “offer made by an issuer . . . for any class of the
95
issuer’s own securities.” Self-tenders generally occur in response to a
hostile tender offer and are organized as a repurchase program in order
to provide shareholders an alternative purchaser and entice them to

87. Id. at 279 (noting that, due to the changing investor, along with the economic and political
climate of the time, the “1980s marked a period of massive wealth shifting, but little wealth creation.”).
88. Id. at 280. For those unfamiliar with the corporate legal field, “Delaware corporate law has
been transformed into something akin to a national law of corporations as other states follow its lead
. . . [T]here can be no dispute that Delaware is winning the race.” Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a
Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations, 77 Wash. U. L.Q. 1099, 1099–1100 (1999); see
also Makinen et al., supra note 24, at 34 (“[D]irectors of California corporations would be served well
by understanding Delaware case law, which is based on the same basic duties of care and loyalty as
clearly apply to California corporations.”).
89. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
90. Moore, supra note 79, at 281.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
94. Moore, supra note 79, at 283.
95. Meredith M. Brown et al., Takeovers: A Strategic Guide to Mergers and Acquisitions
xxxi (3d ed. 2011).
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96

decline the hostile offer. In evaluating Unocal’s defensive strategy, the
court laid out two conditions that must be met before boards in similar
97
situations would receive the protection of the business judgment rule.
The court explained that “[f]irst, directors must show that they had
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed. This burden is satisfied by showing good faith and
reasonable investigation. Second, the defensive measures must be
98
reasonable in relation to the threat posed.” Thus, boards can use drastic
measures when they believe an outsider’s attempted purchase threatens
the corporation, but the measures need to be informed, in good faith,
and reasonable. The court also explained that when taking these types of
measures, the board could consider the interests of “shareholders . . . and
99
perhaps even the community generally.” Additional permitted
considerations are “inadequacy of the price, nature and timing of the
offer, questions of illegality, risk of nonconsummation, quality of
100
securities being offered, and the bidder’s identity and background.” In
conclusion, this case, along with Van Gorkom, exemplified the Delaware
Supreme Court’s move away from a presumption of business judgment
rule protection toward demanding a higher standard of board members
in sale situations.
4.

Revlon Duties Creation and Clarification

Building upon the court’s development toward a less deferential
review of corporate decisions, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
101
Holdings, Inc. created the “Revlon duties” that are well-known today
102
in corporate law. In 1985, the CEO of Pantry Pride, Ronald O.
Perelman, started to discuss an acquisition of Revlon by Pantry Pride
with a representative from Revlon, Michel C. Bergerac, who had strong
103
personal dislike for Perelman. In response to Perelman’s interest, the

96. Edward Brodsky & M. Patricia Adamski, Law of Corporate Officers and Directors:
Rights, Duties and Liabilities § 6:9 (2015).
97. Moore, supra note 79, at 283.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
102. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585, 603 (Del. Ch. 1987), aff’d, 535
A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
103. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176. The board of Pantry Pride authorized Perelman to acquire Revlon,
either by negotiating for $42–$43 per share or by making a hostile tender offer at $45 per share. Id. at
176. Revlon was advised by one of its investment bankers that $45 per share was a “grossly inadequate
price for the company.” Id. at 176–77. Pantry Pride then made a cash tender offer at $47.50 per share
and the Revlon board began to explore defensive measures. Id. at 177. The directors at Revlon created
a Rights Plan, which was considered to be a “poison pill” in corporate takeover language. Id. at 180
(citing Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985)). A “poison pill” has been described
as a scheme where shareholders get the right to be bought out by the corporation at a substantial
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Revlon board authorized the company’s management to negotiate with
104
other parties also interested in acquiring Revlon. While Revlon
searched for other acquirers, Pantry Pride continued to raise its initial
cash bid offer of $45 per share, until it reached a final proposition of $58
105
per share. The Revlon board eventually decided that it wanted
Forstmann Little & Co., an acquirer it apparently had more friendly
106
feelings toward than Pantry Pride or Perelman, to acquire Revlon. The
board bolstered Forstmann’s bargaining power by giving Forstmann
access to Revlon financial data that Pantry Pride was not aware of,
107
placing the two parties on unequal negotiation grounds. Following
negotiations, Forstmann made an offer less than Pantry Pride’s, at $57.25
per share, and also required the Revlon board to put into place several
108
defensive measures. The Revlon board complied with Forstmann’s
request and accordingly put into place numerous defensive strategies to
109
insulate the company from Pantry Pride and other potential acquirers.
Thereafter, Pantry Pride sought injunctive relief barring Revlon’s
defensive strategies and requested a temporary restraining order on
110
Revlon’s assets to halt any attempted transfer to Forstmann. In
evaluating Pantry Pride’s claims, the court considered the appropriateness
of the Revlon board’s actions, most importantly, in the implementation
111
of the defensive measures.
premium price. Id. Revlon launched its own offer for up to ten million shares and its stockholders
tendered eighty-seven percent of outstanding shares. Id. at 177, 181–82.
104. Id. at 176–77.
105. Id. at 179–80.
106. Id. at 175, 176, 178.
107. Id. at 178.
108. Id. at 175, 178. These defensive measures included a lock-up option (an option for Forstmann
to purchase certain assets), a no-shop provision (a promise by Revlon to deal only with Forstmann),
and Revlon agreeing to a $25 million cancellation fee to go to Forstmann if their agreement was
terminated. Id.
109. Id. at 178–79. The Revlon court explained that, in implementing antitakeover measures, the
concern arises that a “board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the
corporation and its shareholders.” Id. at 180 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 954 (Del. 1985)). Due to this potential conflict of interest, the directors of a board using defensive
tactics has the burden of showing that they had a reasonable belief that the corporation was in danger
and this burden can by satisfied by a showing of good faith and reasonable investigation. Id. (citing
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955). The directors also have to show “that the responsive action taken [was]
reasonable in relation to the threat posed.” Id. (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955).
110. Id. at 179.
111. Id. at 175–76. The court analyzed the separate defensive measures that the Revlon board
implemented. The first defensive tool that the court examined was the “poison pill” Rights Plan. Id. at
180. When Revlon initially implemented the Rights Plan, the Pantry Pride hostile takeover bid was at
$45 per share, which was a price that the Revlon board was advised as being grossly inadequate,
making the implementation of the poison pill reasonable and in good faith. Id. at 180–81.
Nevertheless, the continued use of the Rights Plan became moot when, for the favor of Forstmann, the
board passed a resolution redeeming the Rights in regard to any cash proposal of $57.25 or more. Id.
at 181. All of the involved offers eventually equaled or surpassed that amount so the Rights were no
longer an obstruction in the contest for acquisition. Id. The court then analyzed the Revlon board’s
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In the Revlon holding, the court emphasized a higher standard in
the realm of board member fiduciary duties during an acquisition or
112
The court explained that the Revlon directors undertook
sale.
considerations not related to the maximization of shareholder profit, and
that such measures could not “be sustained when [they] represent[] a
113
breach of the directors’ fundamental duty of care.” Therefore, the
court concluded that the board’s actions were not entitled to business
114
judgment rule deference. Instead, the court held the Revlon board to a
higher standard, explaining that when the board members first
recognized that the company was for sale, their duties changed from
ensuring the “preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to [maximizing]
115
the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.” Therefore,
“[t]he directors’ role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to
auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale
116
of the company.” Thus, the court emphasized that boards are required
to keep shareholders’ best interests as their primary focus and that less
deference would be afforded if there appeared to be deviation from that
practice.
Several years later, building upon Revlon, Paramount
117
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. addressed a portion of the Revlon
118
framework that Revlon left unclear: when is a company “for sale?” In
Paramount, a planned merger between Time and Warner was set to take
119
place. When Paramount learned of the intended merger, Paramount
announced an impeding offer for Time at $175 per share, which Time
120
rejected. Paramount then raised its all cash offer to $200 per share,
121
which Time, again, rejected. The Time board genuinely believed that
the merger with Warner was going to be better for the Time company in

own exchange offer for ten million of its own shares, which may have been reasonable when Pantry
Pride’s offer was at $47.50 a share; however, when Pantry Pride increased its offer to “$53, it became
apparent to all that the break-up of the company was inevitable.” Id. at 182. The court further noted
that “Forstmann had already been drawn into the contest on a preferred basis, so the result of the
lock-up was not to foster bidding, but to destroy it” and that “the [no-shop] agreement . . . ended
rather than intensified the board’s involvement in the bidding contest.” Id. at 183–84.
112. See id. at 185.
113. Id. (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985)). The court explained that
Revlon’s defensive tactics worked to the benefit of the shareholders in the beginning; however,
considering the totality of the defensive moves throughout the life span of the takeover period, the
court found that the directors considered inappropriate factors. Id.
114. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185.
115. Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
118. Moore, supra note 79, at 285–86.
119. Id. at 286.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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122

the long run. Consequently, out of fear that Time shareholders would
be blindly attracted to Paramount’s high cash offer, the Time board
123
changed the structure of their planned merger with Warner. Time and
Warner restructured the merger from a stock swap to a cash offer,
thereby eliminating the need for a vote from the shareholders and
124
allowing Time to continue with its original plan. In response, both
Paramount and shareholders of Time filed suits, which were eventually
125
consolidated, to halt the planned merger with Warner. The court had
to evaluate whether to allow Time and Warner to proceed with their
126
restructured merger.
The Paramount court held that there are two circumstances that
127
constitute a sale and require the board to act as an auctioneer. These
situations arise, “[(1)] when the corporation initiates the bidding process,
seeking to sell itself or to effect a reorganization involving a change in
control or a clear breakup of the company; and [(2)] when, in response to
a bidder’s offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an
128
alternative.” The court drew attention to the fact that Time’s board was
able to document a long-term strategy before implementing defense
129
mechanisms. The opinion stated that the “legitimacy of a long-range
plan is important when determining whether a board reasonably views
130
and reacts to an acquiror [sic] as a threat.” The holding in Paramount
could be read to imply that courts will afford boards a degree of
deference when they are in disagreement with their shareholders, if the
boards could show a legitimate long-term plan that they were
implementing to protect the company.
In summary, combining Revlon together with Paramount suggests
that courts will require that boards pursue the best price for their
shareholders in acquisitions, unless it appears that the board is
implementing a long-term strategy to protect the company. This proposition
relates to acqui-hires because target boards are not “auctioning” off their
companies to get the best price, nor are they implementing long-term
strategies to legitimately protect their companies and shareholders. The
enhanced duties created in Revlon and Paramount are essential in change
of control situations because the circumstances of such situations pose an
extremely high risk to shareholders.

122. See Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1144–45, 1149.
123. See Moore, supra note 79, at 286.
124. Id.
125. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1141–42.
126. Id. at 1142.
127. Moore, supra note 79, at 286.
128. Id. at 286–87. The court also noted that the possibility that a shareholder would tender in
ignorance of another strategic benefit could be considered a perceived threat. Id. at 287.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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Justifications for Revlon Duties

In situations involving corporate break ups, courts have agreed that
131
the actions taken by boards are subject to enhanced scrutiny. This
heightened scrutiny is necessary due to the possible reduction of current
shareholders’ voting power and the fact that a control premium, which is
132
an asset that belongs to stockholders, is being sold. Moreover, the
courts have clarified that the duty “announced in Revlon, is not an
independent duty, but rather a restatement of directors’ duties of loyalty
133
and care.” It has been shown that “[d]irectors need not follow a
particular path to maximize stockholder value, but the directors’ path
134
must be a reasonable exercise toward accomplishing that end.” In the
context of acqui-hiring, these justifications are applicable because the
target investors are not being guaranteed a process to maximize value,
and they lose voting power and control when the company is acquired
and dissolved.
To conclude, this Part presented the relevant information on acquihires and analyzed the heightened scrutiny applied to board acquisition
decisions when shareholder interest is in question. Acqui-hire transactions
are only increasing in frequency and becoming more recognizable by the
technology and legal communities. They are generally structured in a
form more favorable to target employees than shareholders, and many
times result in the premature death of an emerging company. In the past,
Delaware courts have encountered situations where boards have made
questionable decisions regarding their duties to shareholders in acquisition
circumstances. At that time, the courts stepped up and demanded
protection for shareholders in those types of situations. In extending the
combined rationale of Revlon and Paramount to the acqui-hire context,
it can be argued that acqui-hire target investors are losing power and
control at a price that could easily be less than what they deserve.
II. An Examination of the Issues Posed by Acqui-Hires and an
Offered Solution
It is certain that “the use of acqui-hires to obtain talent
135
continues;” however, investors, such as the founder of 500 Startups
136
venture fund, Dave McClure, have given warning about the practice.
McClure explained that these types of talent acquisitions are “not what

131. Paramount Commc’ns v. Qvc Network, 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994).
132. Id.
133. Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518, at *10 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(citing In re Answers Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 6170-VCN, 2012 WL 1253072, at *6 (Del. Ch. 2012)).
134. Id.
135. Joseph W. Bartlett et al., Advanced Private Equity Term Sheets and Series A
Documents § 7.16 (2014).
136. Helft, supra note 1.
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we are aiming for as investors . . . . We are trying to build large, lasting
137
businesses.” Another well-known activist investor from Starboard
Value has also critiqued the practice, insisting in a 2014 open letter to the
CEO of Yahoo, that Yahoo “stop [its] pricey and ‘aggressive acquisition
138
strategy’ dead in its tracks.” The frank letter stated that “[t]he $1.3
billion spent on acquisitions has clearly not delivered value to
shareholders,” and that “the acquired companies were, and still are,
139
losing a considerable amount of money.” Nevertheless, warnings from
investors such as these have still not “stopped some of tech’s biggest
names for which buying season never seems to wane. Yahoo and
Facebook snapped up at least 6 different small fish in 2014 alone, which
140
[was] dwarfed by the 29 swallowed whole by Google.” Considering that
the concerns investors have presented are going unacknowledged by
large corporations, courts will likely have to make a determination
regarding this practice soon.
A. Lawsuits Involving Acqui-Hires Are Beginning to Emerge
As acqui-hiring is somewhat of a novel practice, the court system
has not seen many cases; however, those who have commented on acquihiring have warned that lawsuits involving the practice could be on their
141
way. One commentator has stated that there are causes of action
available to shareholders, including fraud and breach of fiduciary
142
duties. These particular causes of action are “centered around the
notion that there’s a lot of money going to some shareholders
143
(founders/employees) but not others (investors).” Expanding upon that
concept in another article, that author warns that “some of these deals
could theoretically be a violation of various corporate and securities laws
that require shareholders of a given class to be treated equally in an
144
acquisition.” In line with these legal predictions, California has already
145
started to encounter complaints bearing the word “acqui-hire.”

137. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
138. Jackson Burke, Have Job, Will Buy Your Firm: Tech’s ‘Acqui-Hire’ Trend, CNBC (Nov. 9,
2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/102164860.
139. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Id.
141. Michael Arrington, Some Investors May Request Protection from Acqui-Hires, Uncrunched
(Apr. 24, 2012), http://uncrunched.com/2012/04/24/some-investors-may-request-protection-from-aquihires/ [hereinafter Arrington, Some Investors May Request Protection from Acqui-Hires]; Michael
Arrington, Facebook to Pay $10 Million Cash for Hot Potato, Says Source, TechCrunch (July 28,
2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/07/28/facebook-to-pay-10-million-cash-for-hot-potato-says-source/
[hereinafter Arrington, Facebook to Pay $10 Million Cash for Hot Potato].
142. See Arrington, Some Investors May Request Protection from Acqui-Hires, supra note 141.
143. Id.
144. Arrington, Facebook to Pay $10 Million Cash for Hot Potato, supra note 141.
145. Response to Defendants’ Motion for Realignment, supra note 13, at 3; Plaintiffs’ Opposition
to Facebook, Inc., supra note 19, at 1.
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One example of an acqui-hire shareholder derivative suit is
Graphicly, Inc. v. Blurb, Inc., wherein the shareholder plaintiff brought
suit against the board members of Graphicly, a target company in an
146
acqui-hire. The shareholder alleged that the Graphicly board breached
its fiduciary duties by terminating and transferring employees, along with
147
failing to protect confidential company information. The complaint
stated that Graphicly and Blurb entered into a nondisclosure agreement
148
after Blurb expressed interest in an acqui-hire of Graphicly.
Thereafter, “Blurb, Inc. had full and complete access to all of Graphicly,
Inc.’s proprietary and confidential information as well as unfettered
access to top management who were allegedly essential to the value and
149
continued success of Graphicly, Inc.” After the sale to Blurb was
complete, the plaintiff claimed that the board terminated all Graphicly
employees and, thereafter, members of Graphicly’s creative team were
150
This resulted in Blurb owning all
immediately hired by Blurb.
proprietary and confidential information that the creative team
151
possessed, which was gained from their employment at Graphicly. “At
the same time, the six co-founders and creative team of Graphicly [who
moved over to Blurb] were encouraging Graphicly’s customers and
152
prospects to migrate to Blurb.” In the end, the shareholders received
only $2.5 million, which was not a penny more than Blurb offered
initially, before it examined Graphicly’s confidential information or
153
negotiations began.
The complaint explained that a derivative suit was necessary
because “Graphicly ha[d] no employees, no leadership, and ha[d] been
stripped of its only real assets. It [was] not capable of taking any action
154
on its own behalf.” The acqui-hire transaction transferred all of
Graphicly’s key talent and intellectual property to Blurb. The plaintiff
asserted that the employees who were allowed to move to Blurb received
all of the benefit in the acqui-hire, while shareholders were left with only
155
the amount of money that made up Blurb’s initial offer. While
Graphicly is still in the pleadings stage, the case presents a viable

146. Jury Demanded, supra note 17; Response to Defendants’ Motion for Realignment, supra note
13, at 3. A shareholder derivative suit is a lawsuit brought by a shareholder on behalf of the
corporation itself. Mary Elizabeth Matthews, The Shareholder Derivative Suit in Arkansas, 52 Ark. L.
Rev. 353, 353 (1999).
147. Jury Demanded, supra note 17, at 2.
148. Id.; Response to Defendants’ Motion for Realignment, supra note 13, at 3.
149. Jury Demanded, supra note 17, at 2.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Response to Defendants’ Motion for Realignment, supra note 13, at 2.
153. Id. at 3.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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opportunity for the court to evaluate acqui-hire transactions and the
156
impact they have on target companies and target shareholders.
Another example of an acqui-hire case is Opperman v. Path, Inc.,
which involved claims brought, not by shareholders, but by past tort
157
victims of the target corporation. The plaintiffs claimed that the acquihire transaction in their case was a fraudulent transfer and imposed
successor liability on the purchaser, Facebook, for past misconduct by
158
the target corporation, Gowalla. The Opperman plaintiffs pled for the
court to take the opportunity to make a judicial determination regarding
159
the practice of acqui-hires.
The complaint asserted that the acqui-hire caused Gowalla’s
financial disarray and that by stripping Gowalla of its only real assets, the
160
transaction rendered Gowalla insolvent. As a result of the Opperman
acqui-hire, Gowalla’s two main assetsits principle employees, including
161
its founder, and its technologywere transferred to Facebook. The
plaintiffs claimed that Facebook and Gowalla knowingly failed to reserve
adequate assets or finances to pay Gowalla creditors, such as the
plaintiffs, and instead structured the deal to route the consideration,
162
including stock in Facebook, to the employee managers of Gowalla.
Specifically, the complaint requested that the court find acqui-hires to be
de facto acquisitions, which would require the purchasing corporations to
take on the liabilities of the target companies, or to alternatively label
163
acqui-hires as bona fide personnel licensing agreements. In accordance
with that proposition, the plaintiffs alleged that the acqui-hire constituted
164
a fraudulent transfer, imposing successor liability on Facebook.
Unfortunately for the Gowalla claimants, the Northern District of
165
The court stated there was no
California dismissed the claims.
fraudulent transfer because the plaintiffs did not make a showing that
they could not subject Gowalla’s intellectual property, which Gowalla
166
theoretically retained, to the payment of debts in the future. Also, the

156. The parties mediated this dispute on March 11, 2015 before retired Judge David A. Garcia of
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. (“JAMS”). The parties reached a settlement and
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Approval of Proposed Settlement on May 13, 2015. The
motion was scheduled for hearing on July 23, 2015. Joint Case Management Conference Statement,
Graphicly, Inc. v. Blurb, Inc., No. C-14-04630-EJD, 2015 WL 6452139 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2015).
157. Opperman v. Path, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
158. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Facebook, Inc., supra note 19, at 1–2. For definitions of “successor
liability” and “fraudulent transfer,” see supra note 19.
159. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Facebook, Inc., supra note 19, at 4.
160. Id. at 10.
161. Id. at 7.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 4.
164. Id. at 2.
165. Opperman v. Path, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
166. Id. at 1066.
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judge believed that the plaintiffs’ allegations based on successor liability
were deficient because the plaintiffs did not allege that Facebook
167
“acquired” Gowalla. In support of this assessment the judge explained
that “the [Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint] expressly
allege[d] the opposite: that Facebook acquired employees and intellectual
168
property rights, but not Gowalla itself.” Indeed, the Opperman case is
slightly convoluted, but it does reveal that plaintiffs need to be cautious
when phrasing their allegations while courts familiarize themselves with
the practice of acqui-hiring.
In conclusion, commentators have identified that causes of action
related to acqui-hires may be available, and Graphicly and Opperman
are two such examples. Acqui-hires raise many legal concerns including
fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, fraudulent transfer, and successor
liability. This is a new practice that courts might be unfamiliar with, and
guidance is needed in order to protect those that are adversely affected
in these transactions. In untangling this corporate legal web, the best
starting point is to address the duties of the target boards and identify
what obligations the boards have. When attempting to distinguish what
obligations should be imposed, it is best to begin first with analyzing
exactly how shareholders are being harmed in these transactions.
B. What Do Acqui-Hires Take from Shareholders?
Concerns for shareholders at acqui-hire target corporations include
a division between employees and shareholders based on the purchase
price and a diminished life on their investment. As mentioned earlier in
this Note, buyers in these transactions offer the deal consideration,
including the consideration pot and the compensation pot, in a single
169
aggregate amount. While outside investors and employees would
prefer a greater amount to be allocated to the consideration pot, moving
employees and the buyer want a greater amount to go toward the
170
This creates a rift between employees and
compensation pot.
shareholders and, in fact, many of those who participate in acqui-hires
admit to an amount of collusion between buyers and moving
171
employees. Therefore, these transactions can be dangerous for target
shareholders, who might receive extremely nominal or no consideration

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 297–99. Both the consideration pot, which eventually goes to
outside investors and shareholders, and the compensation pot, which goes to the desired founders and
employees for future work, are offered together. Id. at 297–98; see supra Part I.A.3.
170. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 3, at 299. The buyer wants more to go to the compensation pool
because that pool provides incentives to move to the target employees, which is what the buyer cares
about. See id.
171. Id.

Nolan-67.3.docx (Do Not Delete)

872

3/21/2016 10:26 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:849

172

in the deal. Moreover, acqui-hires cut the life of an investment short
and diminish expected return if the consideration includes stock in a
173
slower-growth public company. In addition to the significant concerns
about the amount of payments shareholders receive at the closing of
these transactions, there are also arguments that other rights of
shareholders are being violated.
An acqui-hire could constitute a conversion of a corporate
opportunity, as the target company’s likely greatest opportunity at
success rests with the engineering team to be acquired. The corporate
opportunity doctrine explains that “[c]orporate officers and directors are
not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further
174
To illustrate, at the time of investing,
their private interests.”
shareholders are under the impression that they have first “dibs” to the
engineering innovations that the team creates. This makes the
engineering team itself a huge part of what the shareholders believe they
were securing with their initial investment. However, after an acqui-hire,
the “opportunity” for these investors to benefit from the team’s potential
is transferred to the moving managing employees and the purchaser.
Therefore, not only is the seizing of employees a main focus that
shareholders need to consider, but also the resulting loss of any possible
profits from current and future projects.
It has been suggested that when an acqui-hire buyer not only
poaches the team, but also takes the team’s projects, it eliminates the
target company’s ability to sell those projects as an asset to another
175
entity. It could be the case that “the acquiring corporation recognizes
that value of the project but, nonetheless, prefers to bury the project to
176
eliminate threats to its business model.” This is an issue for target
investors because if the engineering team has proven itself well enough
to get acqui-hired, then “surely, there often would be a party willing to
177
pay some amount for these projects.” The inability of the target
companies to sell projects raises yet another concern that shareholders of
target corporations are not being given an opportunity to get the greatest

172. Makinen et al., supra note 24, at 33.
173. Id.
174. DeLarme R. Landes, Economic Efficiency and the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: In
Defense of a Contextual Disclosure Rule, 74 Temp. L. Rev. 837, 844 (2001) (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc.,
5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)). The doctrine is a “mechanism for allocating property rights between a
corporation and those who manage it” so that managers of a corporation can not personally take
business opportunities that they become aware of, due to their position, from the corporation without
following specific disclosure protocols. Id. at 843 (quoting Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to
Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 Yale L.J. 277, 279 (1998)).
175. Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Examining the Tax Advantage of Founders’ Stock, 97
Iowa L. Rev. 1085, 1097 (2012).
176. Id. at 1098 n.48.
177. Id. at 1098.
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return on their investment, even if there does have to be a dissolution of
the company. In addition to the issues of consideration division and loss
of corporate opportunities and assets, there is also a concern that target
corporations are protecting employees rather than shareholders, in
conflict with their traditional fiduciary duties.
C. Do Acqui-Hires Reflect a Fiduciary Duty to Employees or Are
Employees Actually Harmed Too?
Acqui-hires present a multifaceted situation for moving employees,
encompassing a range of positive and negative aspects. For example, on
one hand, the target employees stand to make a great amount of money
in these deals. On the other hand, they may be required to stay at the
buying company for an extended period of time to realize that money,
and they will likely lose the ability to continue work on their current
projects. Nevertheless, however employees perceive these deals,
shareholder experience is supposed to be the focus at the target corporation.
In acqui-hire transactions, it appears that the moving employees
might be the ones at the target company who are getting the large
payouts, while the investors are left with nominal amounts. Even though
American corporate law requires fiduciary duties to shareholders, not to
employees, many of the benefits that acqui-hire participants put forth
seem to speak to the advantages that the target employees experience,
with little discussion of effects on the target shareholders. To illustrate,
Vaughan Smith, Facebook’s Director of Corporate Development and a
participant in the twenty or so talent acquisitions that the company has
participated in over the past four years, has made the assessment that
178
“[e]ngineers are worth half a million to one million.” The employees
who are acquired in these transactions get a highly rich salary and often
179
even more stock options. Dave McClure, an investor previously
mentioned, has said that these sales for “a few million will not make or
break [the] funds” of target investors, but “it could amount to a tidy sum
180
for an engineer just out of college.” Paul Graham, another well-known
investor and a partner at Y Combinator, a firm that has invested in
hundreds of start-ups, has asked, “[w]ho are we to tell a young
181
entrepreneur that they can’t have their first million?” These remarks
suggest that commentators have taken notice that, if anyone is getting
rich in these transactions, it is not investors, but the moving employees.
While it is true that moving employees may stand to make the
greatest initial profit, the acqui-hire process still presents issues that

178.
179.
180.
181.

Helft, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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many target engineers will face when they are acquired. In fact, even
though “[n]either the acquired nor the acquirers like to talk numbers. . . .
the acquisitions are generally in stock, and employees typically must wait
182
a year or more before they can sell their shares.” In regard to this, one
of the largest acqui-hire purchasers, Facebook, contends that structuring
the transactions this way is beneficial as a buyer because they “need[]
creative entrepreneurs who can also help keep Facebook’s start-up
183
culture alive.” Moreover, when a buyer takes ownership of the past
projects, even if it has no interest in furthering them, the buyer reduces
the risk that the acquired team would continue developing the projects
184
on the side, because any success in such projects would go to the buyer.
Therefore, taking ownership of the projects is a way to reduce the risk of
employee disloyalty, as well as stifle possible competition by successful
185
engineers. In addition, along the lines of employee concerns, but unrelated
to the concerns of moving employees, an even more disheartening fact is
that employees that are not desired and do not join the buying company
186
are generally laid off following the transaction. In conclusion, the sum
value of these concerns is that acqui-hired engineers can be encouraged
to work at slower growth public companies for a minimum amount of
time based on stock structure. Furthermore, the opportunity of innovation
for them personally and society as a whole is robbed in an effort to reduce
competition in the field. Whilst acqui-hires present troublesome
circumstances for investors and employees alike, an answer to these
concerns can be found in Revlon duties.
D. Structures of Acqui-Hires Comply with the Requirements to
Trigger REVLON
The structure of acqui-hire transactions falls squarely within the
required elements laid out in Revlon:
[C]ircumstances requiring enhanced judicial scrutiny give rise to what
are known as Revlon duties, such as [(1)] when the board enters into a
merger transaction that will cause a change in corporate control, [(2)]
initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell the corporation, or
187
[(3)] makes a break up of the corporate entity inevitable.

182. Id. (emphasis added).
183. Id.
184. Polsky & Hellwig, supra note 176, at 1097.
185. Id.
186. Darshan Shankar, What Is a Typical Deal Structure of an Acquihire?, Quora (Dec. 10, 2012),
https://www.quora.com/What-is-a-typical-deal-structure-of-an-acquihire.
187. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 928 (Del. 2003) (citing Paramount
Commc’ns v. Qvc Network, 637 A.2d 34, 47 (Del. 1994), and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)).
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Acqui-hires can arguably satisfy the second circumstance, “initiating
188
an active bidding process seeking to sell,” because these deals are
generally framed as asset sales, and therefore, the target boards do find
themselves in an active sale process. Comparatively, even if stock is
included in the deal consideration, the result is the buying company
having a controlling share in the target, at least until they formally
dissolve it, therefore qualifying as a “merger transaction that will cause a
189
change in corporate control.” In addition, as acqui-hires become
increasingly common in the small Silicon Valley, it can be argued that
when target board members seriously consider an acqui-hire offer, they
should be aware that dissolution of the company is “inevitable,”
satisfying the third circumstance. Each of these occurrences, especially
considered collectively, show that acqui-hire transactions meet the
circumstances requiring enhanced judicial scrutiny and the application of
Revlon.
The argument could be made that these “break ups” are not
inevitable because acqui-hire buyers could keep the company alive in a
theoretical sense, but the requirements for Revlon duties, nevertheless,
would still be present. For example, the buyer could argue that
dissolution of the target is not “inevitable” simply because the buyer
could still theoretically pursue the target company’s past projects.
However, in order for Revlon duties to take effect, Revlon does not
require that a dissolution or break up necessarily be “inevitable,” per
190
se. The court in Revlon did state that one of the circumstances that
191
requires heightened scrutiny is an inevitable dissolution. It does not,
however, follow that such is a necessity before directors are subject to
enhanced scrutiny and are required to retrieve the best value available to
192
stockholders. In fact, Revlon stated, “‘when bidders make relatively
similar offers, or dissolution of the company becomes inevitable,’ the
193
directors need to fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties.” Furthermore, in
interpreting Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court has reiterated that this
enhanced scrutiny and need to obtain the best value for shareholders is
present when “there is a pending sale of control, regardless of whether
194
[. . .] there is to be a break-up of the corporation.” Two events that

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 46.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. (quoting Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184) (internal quotation marks omitted).
194. Id. at 46; see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989)
(stating that directors have a responsibility to attain the highest value reasonably attainable for
shareholders when there is a sale of corporate control); Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279,
1286 (Del. 1989) (asserting that Revlon governs every case in which even a fundamental change of
corporate control occurs or is contemplated).
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have the greatest impact on stockholders are both the sale of control or a
corporate break up, and therefore, each of these events alone creates the
requirement that directors be charged with attaining the best value for
195
shareholders, and each is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. Both a
sale of control and a break up implicate a corporation in a significant,
fundamental, and likely irreversible way; accordingly, Revlon duties are
196
ignited in both instances. Therefore, even if an acqui-hire buyer could
argue that dissolution of the target corporation is not “inevitable,” the
sale of control itself could ignite heightened scrutiny of the target board’s
decisions.
Moreover, even if the acqui-hire process is not viewed as a
dissolution that satisfies the requirements for igniting Revlon, and
instead is seen as controlling investors or managers exercising their right
to sell, the practice still calls for a higher level of review. Acqui-hires by
nature involve a great amount of self-dealing, as many of those who may
be engaged in the negotiation process on the seller’s side will likely be
future employees of the buying side. In fact, one attorney author has
warned that insulation of board members in acqui-hires is important
because “assuming [the target company’s stock] is held by a small cohort,
197
most if not all of the directors will be ‘interested’ in the transaction.”
Furthermore, the business judgment rule should not offer protection in
these circumstances because that rule itself calls for its use only when
198
there is no conflict of interest present. Based on the business judgment
rule’s own requirements, along with the general need to provide
protection for shareholders, courts should analyze these transactions
under a reasonableness or an entire fairness standard. Moreover, even if
the target’s biggest controlling institutional investors approve of the deal,
the general rule that controlling investors can sell their control at a
premium price has exceptions, including bad faith and conversion of a
199
corporate opportunity. For the reasons stated above, it can easily be a
concern that these deals will be completed in bad faith on the part of the
target company and/or its controlling investors. Looking further, not only
do the structures of these transactions comply with requirements for
higher judicial review, but the surrounding corporate climate calls for
heightened scrutiny as well.

195. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 47–48.
196. Id.
197. Danielle Naftulin, So You’re Being Acqui-Hired . . . , Cooley GO, https://www.cooleygo.com/
acqui-hire-basics/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
198. FDIC v. Castetter, 184 F.3d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999).
199. Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 684, 685 (1979).

Nolan-67.3.docx (Do Not Delete)

April 2016]

3/21/2016 10:26 PM

ACQUI-HIRE TRANSACTIONS

877

E. The Surrounding Concerns That First Brought About REVLON
Duties Are Present in the Acqui-Hire Structure
The environment surrounding acqui-hire transactions is reminiscent
of the climate that brought about Revlon duties in the first instance. As
mentioned in Part I.B, the decisions in Revlon and surrounding cases
200
were influenced by the corporate climate of the 1980s. The corporate
focus of that time, similar to the focus in acqui-hires, was on short-run
201
returns instead of long-term gains. The acquirers then, similar to the
acqui-hire purchasers now, were not concerned with the target
202
corporations themselves or their shareholders. Thirty years ago, the
courts stepped in when directors and institutional investors began
restructuring corporate transactions at the detriment to shareholders;
now an intervention by the courts is needed again. Even if some might
contend that Revlon does not apply to these deals, corporate judges are
well known for their desire to implement good policy and they will likely
be willing to stretch the Revlon policy where needed.
F.

REVLON Duties Can Apply to Boards of Private Companies and
the Duties Exist When There Is a Single Bidder

Those who disagree that acqui-hires ignite Revlon duties could
argue that the common target corporations are not thought to be the
type traditionally encompassed by Revlon. This could be either because
the targets are generally private companies or because there is usually
only a single bidder. These arguments, however, have been deflated by
legal literature and recent Delaware cases.
The Revlon court’s language raised doubt as to whether Revlon
203
duties were a responsibility of directors for private companies, which
most of the targets in acqui-hires are. Yet, valid arguments have been
raised for applying these duties to nonpublic companies. When the
Revlon court made its decision, the opinion appeared to limit Revlon
duties to only public corporate break ups by avoiding all change of
204
control and prefatory language. Nevertheless, if the holding “could be
expanded under the prefatory language, then the sale of control of a
205
private company could trigger Revlon.” This relates to acqui-hire deals
because most of the targets are likely private corporations and the
transactions result in a change of control in the buyer’s favor. Moreover,
authors of another piece that briefly explores Revlon duties in the

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Moore, supra note 79, at 277–79.
Id. at 278–79.
Id. at 279.
Kerr, supra note 9, at 644 n.255.
Id.
Id.
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context of acqui-hires, argue that boards of private companies, regardless
of size, could possibly still be bound by the fiduciary duties created in
206
Revlon. The authors caution that California corporations should be
mindful of Delaware corporate law because California applies the same
207
In the discussion of Revlon’s
basic duties of care and loyalty.
application to private companies, they cite the In re Openlane, Inc.
decision, in which the court explained that “‘[t]he fact that a company is
small . . . does not modify core fiduciary duties. . . . In other words, small
208
companies do not get a pass just for being small.’” The article
acknowledges that there is a potential for deference to a board when it is
made up of founders and experienced professional investors, and also
that there is a reduced risk of shareholder litigation in closely held
209
companies. Nevertheless, it warns that boards that are considering
acqui-hire transactions still have an obligation to fulfill their duties of
210
care during these deliberations. The piece cautions that these private
target boards “should carefully review potential alternative buyers,
market and competitive factors, and company projections and financing
211
While the authors of that article caution that the
prospects.”
application of Revlon to acqui-hires could eventually be a possibility, this
Note proposes that, in consideration of each of the unsettling factors
presented, courts should begin applying the Revlon standard now.
Acqui-hire transactions are generally structured with an initial
single-bidder, but even in single bidder situations (as compared to cases
such as Revlon, where competing bidders were present) boards are still
required to satisfy their Revlon duties. The Delaware Court of Chancery,
just two years ago, heard two cases that questioned whether two different
boards satisfied their Revlon duties within sale-of-control transactions
212
involving a single bidder. In both cases, the court found that the
board’s initial decision to pursue a single-bidder process was
213
reasonable. However, in only one of the cases, In re Plains Exploration
& Production Co. Stockholder Litigation, did the court conclude that the

206. Makinen et al., supra note 24, at 33–34 (citing Cirrus Holding Co. Ltd. v. Cirrus Indus., Inc.,
794 A.2d 1191 (Del. Ch. 2001)).
207. Id. at 34.
208. Id. (quoting In re Openlane, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6849-VCN, 2011 WL 4599662, at *7
(Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011).
209. Makinen et al., supra note 24, at 34.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Recent Delaware Court of Chancery Decisions
Address Revlon Duties in Single-Bidder Sale-of-Control Transactions 1 (June 17, 2013).
213. Id. (citing In re Plains Exploration & Prod. Co. Stockholder Litig., No. 8090-VCN, 2013 WL
1909124 (Del. Ch. 2013), and Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings, Inc., No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518
(Del. Ch. 2013)).
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board members satisfied their fiduciary duties under Revlon. In the
second case, Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings, Inc., the court found that the
215
directors would likely fail to meet this burden. In Koehler, the court
found that the board had likely failed at carrying out its duties of
remaining fully informed and acting reasonably throughout the process,
216
as required by Revlon. The court in Koehler noted that, “[w]hile a
single-bidder sale process is not per se unreasonable, if a board elects to
pursue a single-bidder process and forgo a presigning market check,”
217
that may be taken into account by a court. The lack of a pre-signing
market check along with the board’s other actions, “taken as a whole,
must result in a process that is reasonably designed to maximize the price
218
to be received by the stockholders.” Moreover, in the single-bidder
process, the target company’s ability, or lack thereof, to “conduct a ‘de
facto,’ postsigning [sic] market check may be significant,” which is
something that a “target’s board should be aware of in negotiating both
the deal protection measures and length of the preclosing [sic] period for
219
the acquisition agreement.” Considering the recent emphasis on the
likelihood of corporate judges to comply with Revlon policy in both
private and single bidder situations, it seems that acqui-hire transactions
have little legal argument to hide behind.
To summarize, this Part pointed to areas that call for concern in
acqui-hire transactions and provided a solution within Revlon duties.
California courts are beginning to see acqui-hire cases and will likely
need to establish a standard under which to scrutinize those claims.
Moreover, acqui-hire transactions take a great amount away from
shareholders including reduced return on investment, possible conversion
of a corporate opportunity, and the inability to sell past projects at a
premium. Also, the way that employees are treated in acqui-hires raises
concerns, ranging from misplaced fiduciary duties that should belong to
the investors, to more negative experiences like an employee’s inability
to continue projects. Lastly, this Part verified that Revlon duties can
apply to acqui-hires due to their structure, and that concerns such as selfdealing increase the need to encourage heightened judicial scrutiny in
these transactions.

214. Id.; In re Plains Exploration & Prod. Co. Stockholder Litig., No. 8090-VCN, 2013 WL 1909124
(Del. Ch. 2013).
215. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, supra note 212, at 1; Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings,
Inc., No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518 (Del. Ch. 2013).
216. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, supra note 212, at 1 (citing Koehler, 2013 WL 2181518).
217. Id. at 6.
218. Id. at 1.
219. Id. at 6.
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Conclusion
When a purchaser approaches a target corporation with an acquihire and the managing board members are seriously considering the
offer, that board’s actions should be strictly scrutinized following the
Revlon standards. At that point, the target company’s directors become
auctioneers for the stockholders. Consequently, they should actively seek
out other companies who might want to be the buyer in the acqui-hire or
even purchase the target in a more traditional manner. The boards owe
fiduciary duties to stockholders, preferred and common, not to
employees, and the Revlon duties explicitly require protection for the
shareholders. To go even further, the standard of review called for under
Revlon is a reasonableness standard; however, considering the fact that
acqui-hires by nature involve a great amount of self-dealing, as many of
those who are engaged in the negotiation process on the seller’s side will
likely be future employees of the buying side, an even higher standard
could be considered if needed. Additionally, bolstering this argument,
the business judgment rule itself also calls for its use only when there is
no conflict of interest present. To protect investors, courts should analyze
these transactions under a reasonableness standard incorporating Revlon
considerations and, even further, an entire fairness standard if selfdealing can be identified.
Though arguments may be made that the target boards do not fall
under Revlon, either because the target companies are private or because
the deals consist of a single bidder, there are still ways to enhance the
judicial scrutiny of these transactions. The general rule governing the
sale of controlling shares specifically says that controlling shareholders
can sell their control at a premium price, but even this standard has
exceptions including bad faith and conversion of a corporate opportunity.
For the reasons stated above, it can easily be a concern that these deals
will be completed in bad faith on the part of the target board. Target
board members in acqui-hires should be scrutinized under a higher
standard than is generally granted to board members. Acqui-hire
transactions encompass the exact concerns that inspired courts to create
the protection of Revlon duties in the first place, and acqui-hires provide
the perfect opportunity for Revlon’s modern application.

